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LEARNING IN THE LAW AND ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE-A REPLY
By BERNARD C. GAVIT*
I.
Mr. Hurley's article expresses, as happily as they can be put,
the arguments against the interpretation of Indiana's constitu-
tional provision on admission to the bar heretofore presented by
me.' The matter is of primary importance, and the question
ought to be thrashed out. I shall attempt, therefore, to reply to
Mr. Hurley's arguments.
We have before us now, in addition to the constitutional pro-
vision, a specific statute. The Bar Association Bill on admis-
sions was enacted into law by the Legislature and approved
by the Governor. It gives to the Supreme Court "exclusive
jurisdiction to admit attorneys to practice law in all courts of
the state under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe."
I insist, with increasing confidence, that under this legisla-
tion the Supreme Court can, without doing any violence to the
Constitution, adopt rules which make educational requirements
a prerequisite for admission to the bar.
The fundamentally fallacious assumption on which Mr. Hur-
ley bases his case is that "good moral character" is a simple,
unambiguous phrase, which because it has generally been as-
sumed to mean what he says it means, necessarily means that;
that it is, too, devoid of legal content, and therefore of difficulty.
He assumes that because he knows what it means that neces-
sarily, that is both its true factual and its legal meaning in its
constitutional sense. I assert, on the contrary, that Mr. Hur-
ley's assumption as to what it means is irrelevant; that factually
it does not preclude educational prerequisites, that it need not
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
'6 Ind. L. J. 67, 16 American B. A. J. 595, 743. During the past
summer the Indiana University library has acquired a file of the Cannelton
Economist which contains several articles by Samuel Frisbie, a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention who was interested in the Constitutional
Clause in question. There is nothing in any part of Mr. Frisbie's com-
munications, however, which mentions the subject-matter; nor was any-
thing published by this paper upon the subject.
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be devoid of legal content; that the evidence and the accepted
standards of constitutional law compel the conclusion that it
does not prevent, but in fact sanctions and commands an educa-
tional standard as a condition for admission to the bar. Nor do
I think that that result is a forced judicial construction of an
invidious type; an accomplishment by indirection of what is
impossible of accomplishment by direct means. But more as to
that later, for the point is the substance of the dispute. Let us
first notice several specific assertions Mr. Hurley makes. He
argues that because it has been more or less generally assumed
for some little time that the Constitution prohibits educational
qualifications that the assumption is conclusive against any
other interpretation.
II.
It is true that attempts to amend the Constitution have been
thwarted; but the question presents itself, is it necessary to
amend it? How solid after all are the assumptions upon which
those people worked who sought to amend it? May not those
people have been mistaken? Certainly their views are entitled
to some consideration; but they are not conclusive. Any as-
sumption is subject to proof of its invalidity. For some fifty
years, for example, an Act of Congress which forbade the re-
moval by the President of appointive officers without the con-
sent of the Senate, was acquiesced in; and assumed to be valid.
But when the validity of the Act was finally put to a test it was
held unconstitutional in'the face of that fact.2
For some several hundred years it has been quite uniformly
assumed by the leading authorities on the subject, and the most
competent of legal scholars, that the action of case owed its
life to the statute of Westminster the Second (1290). But it
has recently been proved by an overwhelming amount of evi-
dence, that that assumption was erroneous, and that the statute
had nothing to do with the action of case.3
A great many people have assumed that prosperity was in
the immediate control of the Republican party; but it has re-
cently been rather conclusively established that that, too, was
erroneous.
2 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
3 Plunckett Case and the Statute of Westminster II, 31 Columbia L.
Rev. 778 (1931).
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In truth Mr. Hurley's assumption is entitled to no weight
at all, because it is not based on evidence and reason, but solely
on popular belief. So far as the evidence is concerned it does
not rise above the status of a myth.
Now the beliefs of even large groups of people have no evi-
denciary weight. And in substance that is all that we have on
the present subject; a rather common belief that the Constitu-
tion prohibited educational prerequisites for admission to the
bar. It is nothing but a belief, because no one yet has produced
any proof to support it. Certainly Mr. Hurley produces none.
The substance of his argument is solely that because people
have believed that that is what it meant, therefore that it is
what it does mean. But, it is, for example, well established in
the law of Wills that the wildest of religious beliefs is no evi-
dence of insanity. The reason is that insanity is irrationality,
and a belief being confessedly based not on reason or evidence
is no evidence of irrationality. It is only what it purports to
be-a belief. So it is that we have never made a practice of
accepting beliefs or myths as evidence. In fact it is only an
opinion which can be received as evidence; and before it is given
any weight it has to be supported by proveable facts and per-
suasive reasoning.
Therefore in attacking this problem we certainly are en-
titled to inquire into the validity of the common belief on the
subject without being compelled to give any weight or credit
to the belief as such. The belief creates no presumption that
it is really supported by the facts, and we ought to be, and in
truth are, free to face the problem unhampered by any unproved
assumptions on the point.
And on that score let me call attention to the fact that the
decisions of the court and the action of the Legislature which
are closest to the Constitutional Convention give the lie to Mr.
Hurley's belief. The Acts of 1852 provided that:
"Eveiy person of good moral character, being a voter, on application
shall be admitted to practice law in all the courts of justice. Moral char-
acter may be proved by any evidence satisfactory to the court
but any court may, at any time, inquire into and determine for itself the
moral character of any person practicing or offering to practice law in
such court."4
4 Revised Stat. 1852, Art. 45, Secs. 766-7.
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The Legislature here makes no attempt to define moral char-
acter against our interpretation, but in truth recognizes that its
proper interpretation is a judicial question, and specifically
gives the courts the widest discretion over the subject-matter.
In the case of Ex parte Wa//s,5 decided in 1880 under the act
just quoted and the subsequent provisions of the same act for
disbarment, the Supreme Court explicitly construed "good moral
character" in the sense we have contended for; that it, it means
character as it affects ability to practice law. The court spe-
cifically refuted the belief expressed by Mr. Hurley; that is,
that "moral character" here means only personal virtuous recti-
tude or physical morality. The attorney in that case was dis-
barred because he cheated his clients, and did not efficiently
represent them and because those facts showed a bad moral
character. It was conceded that if he had a "good moral char-
acter" he could continue to practice law; that is, that an attor-
ney can only be disbarred for the same reasons he could original-
ly be kept out. Now this man was not put out because of his
specific misconduct; but because his niisconduct (which was
primarily mental) affirmatively showed a lack of moral char-
acter.
In the case of McCracken v. State,6 decided in 1867, it was
held that a statute prohibiting a county recorder from practicing
law was valid. In other words, even although one have a "good
moral character" there is an additional valid requirement that
he be not a recorder. That is, the constitutional provision here
is not exclusive. If the Legislature could make not being a
recorder an additional condition for admission to the bar, why
cannot the Legislature, or court, make legal education an addi-
tional prerequisite, if we assume what Mr. Hurley asserts to be
true; that legal education is no part of "good moral character?"
In the case of In re Petition of LeaCh,7 decided in 1893, a woman,
although not a voter was held to be entitled to practice. In
other words, if one who is not a voter can be admitted,. although
the constitution requires him to be a voter; why cannot one who
has a good moral character in Mr. Hurley's definition of the
word, be kept out because he has no legal education? If the
Constitution is really not exclusive as to the voting requirement,
why is it exclusive as to the character requirement? Again, if
573 Ind. 95.
6 27 Ind. 491.
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character and education are distinct concepts what is to prevent
a requirement as to education? The truth is that in both of
those cases the court construed the Constitution to mean exactly
the opposite of what Mr. Hurley says it means, and the only
possible interpretation of them is that the court could impose
an additional requirement of legal education.
And even more persuasive than that we have the fact that
in 1881 the Legislature enacted that
"every person of good moral character, being a voter, on application
shall be admitted to practice law in all the courts of justice; but a jury
may be demanded upon the question of character by any citizen of the
county. Moral character may be proved by any evidence satisfactory to
the court or jury trying the question; and any person desiring admission to
the bar may, upon motion, be examined touching his learning in the law,
by the judge or a committee of the bar whom the judge may select for
that purpose. If he shall be found, by reason of his learning, qualified
to practice the law, as well as otherwise qualified, he shall be admitted to
the practice, which shall be entered of record."s
Here is a statute which has been on the statute books for
fifty years which gives the lie to the assumption that "moral
character" is less than character as an attorney. Certainly in
1881 the proposition which is so clear to Mr. Hurley, was as
clear the other way to the Legislature. The statute has never
been judicially declared unconstitutional and in truth has been
acted upon by some of the circuit courts of this state for fifty
years.
The real truth is that all of the early cases and the early
legislation are quite conclusive against the belief which Mr.
Hurley espouses. Apparently the belief is of rather recent
origin.
Throughout his paper, and particularly the latter portion of
it, Mr. Hurley asserts that because a person has a constitutional
right to practice law if he is of good moral character; that (if
our views prevail) his moral character changes from good to
bad when he presents himself for admission, although without
any knowledge of the law; that that latter fact can only be
ascertained by examination, and that if the applicant stands on
his constitutional right, he must be admitted, and the fact can-
not be proved.
7 134 Ind. 665.
8 Acts 1881, Sec. 831; Sec. 1033, Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat., 1926.
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But Mr. Hurley is deciding the case, and not arguing it. He
assumes the answer (as the courts often do, when no better way
out presents itself) and then proves his result by irresistible
logic. He says only-this man has a constitutional right to prac-
tice law; educational qualifications can not be limitations on it;
therefore he has a constitutional right to practice law without
educational qualifications. The premises and the result are ex-
actly the same. He could prove that black was white by the
same method. That is, by asserting his unproved premise that
black is white; this is black; therefore it is white. But I would
challenge his authority to decide the case; he is merely supposed
to be arguing it. And I still challenge his premise; to wit, that
the man has a constitutional right to practice law without edu-
cational qualifications. If he has one he got it from the Con-
stitution, and that turns on a fair interpretation of that instru-
ment, rather than upon any unsupported preconceptions or as-
sumptions on the subject.
Earlier in his paper Mr. Hurley falls into the common error,
which assumes (in this same connection) that there is a general
principle involved, and not a specific case. He assumes that
"good moral character" as a matter of constitutional law means
something abstractly; just as he says voter means something
abstractly. But in the law we deal not in abstractions (although
we sometimes play as if we do) but in specific situations. One
for example, who was not an applicant for admission to the bar
could not secure a declaration from any court in the state as to
what "good moral character" means. Neither Mr. Hurley nor
myself could get any court to tell us. The court, however, would
tell a bona fide applicant; just as it would tell him whether or
not he was a voter. There is nothing to be gained by arguing
about the matter abstractly. We must take a specific case, and
by Mr. Hurley's own admission the decision of a specific case is
much harder than the assumption of a general principle. He
says: "It is freely granted that whether a particular person is
of good or bad moral character may present its difficulties in a
stated case; but that is not involved here." But it is the only
thing which is involved here. We have, supposedly, a young
man who knows no law, or very little law; who, in other words,
will not make a competent practicing attorney; he is physically
a virtuous young man, and legally a voter; and he makes applica-
tion to be admitted to the bar. In other words, he wants the
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State of Indiana to grant him a license as an attorney at law.
He wants the State to hold him out as learned in the law; he
wants to hold himself out as learned in the law. Does he have
a "good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is
used in the Constitution? Mr. Hurley says, categorically, yes.
But not on the merits; purely on the unproved assumption that
"good moral character" was here used as meaning solely "phys-
ically virtuous." How does he know that? Where is the evi-
dence to prove and warrant that interpretation of the phrase?
It is wholly lacking.
As Mr. Hurley suggests "voter" does not cause much real
difficulty as to its content (although he admits that in a given
case the application of the word might be difficult), but the
reason for that is that we have statutes which define in rather
specific terms the various elements of a "legal voter." We have,
however, no constitutional or statutory definition of "good moral
character." The definition of that phrase is purely, therefore,
a judicial matter. It is not, as Mr. Hurley assumes, to be defined
by common belief.
There is one other argument used by Mr. Hurley which
requires notice. He says that a client has no business being
deceived by an incompetent attorney's misrepresentation as to
his legal ability, because "he is presumed to know the law," and
to know, therefore, that under the Constitution his attorney
may not know any law but may still be an attorney (legally, but
not in fact, of course). (In other words, one who knows the
law goes to one who does not know it to find out what it is!)
(And here Mr. Hurley admits the real point in issue, to wit:
that one who seeks to act as an attorney without any knowledge
of the law does in fact deceive the public.) He resurrects an-
other erroneous assumption, which innumerable times has been
repudiated. There never was, and there is now, no general pre-
sumption that everyone knows the law. The maxim originally
was that "ignorance of the law excuseth no man," and it was
used primarily in criminal actions. 9 But to disprove Mr. Hur-
ley's presumption it is only necessary to call attention to the
great groups of cases where a mistake of law gives quasi-con-
tractual relief,10 and where a misrepresentation as to what the
9 10 R. C. L., p. 873, Sec. 17.
20 Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, Secs. 35-44 (1913).
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law is gives ground for an action of deceit.1 If we had a con-
clusive presumption that those plaintiffs knew the law they
could not be mistaken as to it; nor could they be deceived as to it.
III.
When we come to the merits of the controversy there are
four or five angles of approach. It may well be, for example,
that on authority the constitutional provision in question could
be properly construed to set only minimum standards, and mean
only that if one has the qualifications set out that he could not
be kept out for those reasons. The early cases take this view;
and the later cases do not overrule them; they go off on the
question of the adoption of specific constitutional amendments
on the subject. A court could today with entire propriety follow
those early cases, and it would be unnecessary to decide what
moral character means. Assume that an applicant has a good
moral character; he is not being kept out for that reason, but
for the reason that he has no knowledge of the law, and the
action is proper.
It was suggested in one of the early cases that the constitu-
tion created a right to practice law. But even so it would be
subject to reasonable regulation. Those propositions have been
argued before12 and there is no need of adding anything to what
was there said.
Whatever interpretation we take-other than the one first
suggested-there is left open the judicial question as to what
constitutes good moral character, as that phrase is used in the
Constitution.
But before going to that it is necessary to note another of
Mr. Hurley's arguments as to one of those possible interpreta-
tions. It was suggested heretofore that the substitution of the
phrase "entitled to admission to practice" for the phrase "have
a right to practice," and the Constitutional Convention refusal
to make a resubstitution indicated that a proper interpretation
"1 Ingalls u. Miller, 121 Ind. 188 (1889). See, also, Throckmorton's
Cooley on Torts, Sec. 297 (1930).
12 6 Ind. L. J. 67, 80-88. See, however, Weisenberger v. State, 175
N. E. 239, 240: "A constitutional personal liberty clause, or the right to
pursue any proper avocation, is regarded as an inalienable right, and a
privilege not to be restricted except for good cause." Per Myers, C. J.
(Italics mine.)
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of the phrase would be that a person with the constitutional
qualifications was only "entitled to seek admission ;" or "entitled
to be examined for admission." Mr. Hurley regards this as a
clear case of facetiousness. But again he produces no evidence
to support his conclusion. While I would again call attention
to the fact that the only evidence from the recorded proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention which is of any value whatever
supports that interpretation. The only two members of the
convention who expressed a view as to what the constitutional
section meant, both said it meant exactly that. Mr. Kelso (a
member of the committee which drafted it, and a lawyer) said:
"The section contemplates that there shall be an examination."
And he moved to strike out the words "to admission." And the
motion was never specifically acted upon by the convention;
although by its refusal to act on it there is a record against
the motion. Mr. Borden (who was chairman of the committee,
and who, if committees then were what they are now, really
drafted the provision in question) asked whether certain pro-
posed action, which inferentially was based on Mr. Hurley's
assumption (but which, note well, was lost, also), contemplated
that one who had no legal education could be admitted. I submit
again that those two expressions of opinion are the only ones in
the entire proceedings which give any real inkling as to what
any member of the convention thought on the subject; and they
both expressly support the interpretation of the phrase which
Mr. Hurley says is facetious!
Again, however, I am of the opinion that those expressions
of opinion are not necessarily fastened on the convention; and
that there is no evidence at all from the proceedings of the con-
vention from which it is possible to gain any conclusive light as
to the actual intention of the convention. Had the matter been
argued fully; had a majority of the members expressed an
opinion we would have some material for interpreting the sec-
tion on the basis of its actual intention. As it is it seems quite
impossible to adopt any view other than that the actual inten-
tion of the convention is not discoverable; and the question must
be decided on a fair interpretation of the language used. Al-
though again I should still insist that a court could reasonably
say that the substitution of the phrase "entitled to admission"
for the phrase "have a right" indicated a conscious effort to
make it certain that a person was to be entitled to seek admis-
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sion, and no more. The Constitution could reasonably be con-
strued not only to sanction a legal examination, but in truth
expressly to require it.
IV.
But I am still willing to prove that "good moral character"
includes educational qualifications. There are two possible ap-
proaches to the problem. First, as a factual concept that is
true; second, as a legal concept it could be said to be true, and
therefore to be true as a matter of law.
We must remember that "it is a constitution we are con-
struing." Its proper interpretation is a judicial question, and
not a common question. And we must remember, too, that lan-
guage often has a double meaning. It means one thing to the
ordinary layman; it means another to the lawyer. The first I
speak of as being its factual or common content; the second as
being its legal content. For example, "possession" in fact is
something quite different from "possession" in law; "valuable
consideration;" "ownership," "necessaries," "fraud," "inten-
tion," "benefit," "detriment," all have a legal content at variance
with their factual content. In other words they mean more to
the lawyer than they do to the layman. When we come to the
constitutional words and phrases the same thing is true; and the
discrepancy between the layman's definition and the lawyer's is
even more marked. "Due process of law;" "interstate com-
merce;" "bankruptcy;" "Republican form of government;"
"double jeopardy;" "just compensation;" "jury trial;" "justice
freely and without purchase, speedily and without delay;" "all
laws shall be general" have, at best, a very vague and varying
factual or common content both to the layman and lawyer, but
to the latter they do have an understandable content which will
be quite different from the content a layman would give the
words and phrases.
So the truth is that "good moral character" may well mean
two things. But if we take the first; the factual or common
meaning, it is easy to prove that it includes educational quali-
fications.
Mr. Hurley's assumption to the contrary is based on the
obvious untruth that "good moral character" in fact means only
"physical morality." The actual fact that moral character is
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made up of something more than that is overlooked. It disre-
gards the fact that mental honesty is as much a part of good
character as is physical morality; and as far as an attorney is
concerned it is really a more important part. It is entirely con-
ceivable that a person who had little physical morality would
make a fairly capable attorney; but it is inconceivable that a
person who had no mental character could make a respectable
or capable attorney. Actually it seems preposterous that anyone
should assume that "good moral character" is purely a physical
concept; and that it does not include those other elements of
character which include honesty, integrity, mental ability and
the very ordinary virtue of kindness to and consideration for
others.
Mr. Hurley will find no accepted definition of "moral char-
acter" which agrees with his. Webster's New International
Dictionary defines "moral" as follows: "Characterized by
practical excellence, or springing from or pertaining to man's
natural sense of what is right and proper." The word "ethical"
is given as its synonym; and there is no intimation that the
word is limited in its meaning to "physical virtue." "Character"
is defined as "The sum of qualities or features, by which a
person or thing is distinguished from others; the aggregate of
distinctive mental and moral qualities belonging to an indi-
vidual."14
But why argue the point? It is settled for us by the case of
Ex parte Walls,15 for in that case the Supreme Court specifically
decided that mental honesty and ability are a part of "good
moral character." And truly the decision is in accord with a
purely factual or common interpretation of the word.
To substantiate that assertion we have the special verdict of
at least one jury in this state which so decides.' 6 And if one
13 6 Ind. L. J. 67, 76-77.
14 The matter is so obvious that the teachers and writers on the sub-
ject of Ethics assume it. One will look through all of the published books
on the subject without finding any suggestion which would support Mr.
Hurley's definition of the phrase. In fact Teacher's College at Columbia
University has been conducting a series of character studies, and quite
recently published a large volume on "Deceit" as a part of the series.
15 Supra, No. 5.
16 In cause No. 7971%, Vanderburgh Circuit Court, In the Matter of
the Application of William H. Axton for Admission to the Bar, disposed
of in 1926.
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takes the trouble to ask an intelligent layman what he thinks,
as I have on several occasions, he will get the unanimous opinion
that moral character in an attorney includes educational qualifi-
cations. For is it not actually true that one who wants to de-
fraud and misrepresent people has no character as an attorney?
How can one who is possessed of the virtue of kindness and
consideration for others which is so obviously a part of charac-
ter impose upon others by purporting to represent them as an
attorney when he has no knowledge of the law? The answer is
that he cannot; the only reason he can do that is because he has
no character.
Mr. Hurley misapprehends the situation. He continually talks
of legal education as being good moral character. Of course it is
not; it is here only indicative of it or an element in it in a
specific situation. One who knows no law and makes no attempt
to practice law obviously has not by his mere ignorance of the
law exhibited a lack of character. It is the lack of knowledge of
the law, and the affirmative act of an applicant in seeking a
license to practice law, which shows the lack of character. If
he does practice law and defrauds and misrepresents a person
the law authorizes his disbarment because he has demonstrated
his lack of character. But the law and the fact always have
been that an attempt to commit a wrong was as culpable as
was the commission of the wrong. The heavy foot of equity
has often been placed on the neck of one whose sole wrong-
doing so far had been the intention or threat to misbehave. The
law never was that we had to wait until a man caused an irre-
parable injury before he could be reached by legal processes.
The most important recent development in jurisprudence is the
progress made in the field of preventive justice. A man's inten-
tion is often the measure of his guilt, and he can be sent to the
penitentiary because of it. All we argue for here is that instead
of the state and the courts assisting the man with a dishonest
-mind and character to the commission of his deceit that the law
ought to refuse to be a party to it.
That the public is deceived is self-evident. No one ought to
be licensed to practice law until he has demonstrated that he
can actually practice law instead of deceiving innocent people.
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V.
Even if we accept Mr. Hurley's definition of "good moral
character;" he certainly would urge that it is only a factual
and not a legal definition. Certainly he cites no decision to the
latter effect. So if we do accept it it is no bar to a legal defini-
tion of the phrase to the contrary.
As has been pointed out above many phrases have been given
legal content. This is particularly true of constitutional lan-
guage. One of the accepted means of legal progress is the re-
definition of words. So it is that a Constitution may change in
its factual and legal meaning by the simple expedient of what
we call constitutional interpretation, which after all is the re-
definition of words to meet new situations and to keep the
Constitution up-to-date. No lawyer at least ought to hesitate
over the fact, and we might as well admit it in open court, what-
ever apologetics we offer to the public to explain the change.
If we must argue the point, however, how does it come that
state regulation of interstate rates was originally a valid exer-
cise of the state police power; and later it was not (even before
Congress acted); how does it happen that a state quarantine
law which prohibits interstate commerce is valid because it is
not a regulation of interstate commerce "in the constitutional
sense," whereas a congressional quarantine is valid because it
is; how does it happen that two or three states formerly could
tax personal property because it had a situs in each, whereas
today only one state may tax it? But there is no use multiplying
examples. Case after case gives point to the proposition that a
written constitution is written in form only and that its sub-
stance, meaning and content, being judicial questions are sub-
ject to change without notice, to keep pace with the moral,
economic and political progress of the race.
So certainly a court has the power here, if necessary, to give
a legal content to the phrase "good moral character;" to re-
define it, if necessary, to meet the present needs of the situation.
I would still assert that it is unnecessary, because its factual
content always was and today certainly is in keeping with the
views here expressed. If it be admitted that it is not it would
be no usurpation of power, but strictly in accord with accepted
principles and practices of the judicial function and power to
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bring the Constitution up-to-date by giving legal content to the
phrase.
Finally, it might be urged that if the question is one of fact
it is not a judicial question. But the answer to that is that
questions of fact often become judicial question. Just as the
court has said that one who is injured at an open railroad cross-
ing is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, so
here the Court could easily say that "good moral character" is
of such settled factual significance that the fact and law are
co-extensive.
And is not that the result? The evidence on our side is; that
all of the definitions of moral character include mental honesty
as an element; the only decision of the Supreme Court on the
point includes it; a jury has specifically included it; the average
intelligent layman includes it; the early cases and legislation in
this state included it; some trial courts in this state have been
including it for years without opposition and with the sanction
and acquiescence of all concerned. What is the evidence on
the other side? None. All I ask is that the question be de-
cided on the evidence and not on a mythical basis.
